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INTRODUCTION
To the already treacherous pathway' of pension benefits law under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2 a new legal S-
curve has been added by the Supreme Court in John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank 3 "Following the lead" 4 of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement
Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. ,5 the Court adopted a narrow reading
of ERISA's "guaranteed benefit policy" exception6 and affirmed the holding of
1 See, e.g., Supreme Court Adopts Common Law Test for Determining Who Is an
Employee Under ERISA, 1 ERISA LITIG. REP. (P-H) No. 7, at 3 (suggesting that ERISA
cases are burdensome and that the Court delegates them to junior Justices); Harry V.
Lamon, Jr., Professional Money Managers: Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA, 11
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 519, 519 (1976) (describing ERISA as a "legislative maze of
often ill-defined, amorphous concepts of fiduciary responsibility"). Both of the sources
above are cited in Scott V. Rozmus, Comment, Insurers Beware: General Account Activities
May Subject Insurance Companies to ERISA's Fiduciary Obligations, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
803, 806 n.26 (1994) (evidencing the commonness of "judicial disagreement and confusion
over ERISA").
2 Federal legislation on pension benefits is found in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461) (1988).
3 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
4 Id. at 527 ("[W]e follow the Seventh Circuit's lead, and seek guidance from this
Court's decisions construing the insurance policy exemption ordered in the Securities Act of
1933." (citations omitted)) [Harris IV]; see infra note 16 for an explanation of the case
numbering scheme.
5 698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
6 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (1988). The statute states in pertinent part:
(2) In the case of a plan to which a guaranteed benefit policy is issued by an
insurer, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such policy, but shall not,
solely by reason of the issuance of such policy, be deemed to include any assets of such
insurer. For purposes of this paragraph:
(B) The term "guaranteed benefit policy" means an insurance policy or contract
to the extent that such policy or contract provides for benefits the amount of which is
guaranteed by the insurer. Such term includes any surplus in a separate account, but
excludes any other portion of a separate account.
Id. § 1101(b)(2)(B).
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the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 7 that the insurer/issuer8 of the contract at
issue, Group Annuity Contract No. 50 ("GAC 50"), 9 is an ERISA fiduciary as
to its general account funds. 10 An additional holding of this case deals with
conflicts of law issues between state insurance law and ERISA"I and their
application in relation to ERISA's "preemption" and "savings" clauses. 12
This Note seeks to chart the "odyssey" 13 of Harris Trust. In particular, the
focus will be on the Court's application of securities law's investment contracts
analysis14 to pensions and as a related matter, the Court's stance as to statutory
7 Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138 (2d
Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
8 The term "insurer/issuer" is original to the author, to the best of his knowledge, and
is purposefully drawn to highlight the intermingled securities law issues present in this case.
For a suggestion that pension plans be governed by securities law regulation, see Keir N.
Dougall, Note, Augmenting ERISA with Market Discipline: Transforming Pension Plan
Interests into Securities, 24 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 709 (1991).
9 Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 998,
999 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 970 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1992), aft'd,
114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
10 "General account funds" or simply "general account" refers to the general
corporate assets of the insurer, into which revenues are credited and from which liabilities
and expenses are paid. See Stephen H. Goldberg & Melvin S. Altman, The Case for the
Nonapplication of ERISA to Insurers' General Account Assets, 21 TORT & INS. L.J 475,
475 (1986) (defining "general account" as general corporate assets); id. at 476 n.8 and
accompanying text (explaining the nature of the corporate general assets).
II See Harris lV, 114 S. Ct. at 525.12 Id. at 525-26. On one hand, ERISA preempts state law in the area of pension
benefits. This famous ERISA "preemption" clause states in pertinent part, that the statute
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). At the same time, Congress also
enacted the ERISA "savings" clause, which removes "the business of insurance" from
federal ERISA preemption, thereby leaving such items to state regulation. The savings
clause states that ERISA "shall [not] be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any
law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
For competing viewpoints on ERISA preemption in the insurance context, compare
Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 477 (discussing the variance of standards of care
between ERISA and state insurance law and concluding that "the application of ERISAI]
... would place an insurer in an untenable position of divided loyalties") with Rozmus,
supra note 1, at 824 (arguing that insurers "cannot use state insurance laws to escape ...
ERISA").
13 WnBsTm's NEW WORLD DICrIONARY (3d College ed. 1988) defines an "odyssey"
as "any extended wandering or journey." The term originates from Homer's epic poem
detailing the wanderings of Odysseus, a Greek hero who literally travels to hell and back
home following the fall of Troy. HOMER, ODYSSEY (Doubleday & Co. 1961). This term is
chosen to symbolize the complexity of the case's background.
14 Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides a class exemption from its
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construction in this area.
Part I of this Note briefly outlines some basic concepts of ERISA. Part II
reviews the historical background of Harris Trust, seeking to reconstruct
various facts scattered-not unlike ERISA's provisions in the United States
Code' 5-across four opinions. 16 Part M considers the Supreme Court decision
and focuses on the Court's discussion of the method and standard for
determining the scope of the guaranteed benefits policy exemption. 17 Part IV
registration requirements under § 5 for "[amny insurance or endowment policy or annuity
contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of
the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like
functions, of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia .....
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1994). For a discussion of the insurance and annuity exemption in
securities law, see Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcuxrriEs
REGULATION § 3A.1.f (1993).
15 ERISA tax issues are administered by the Treasury Department, whereas fiduciary
and other aspects are regulated by the Department of Labor. DAN M. MCGILL & DONALD
S. GRUBBS, JR., FUNDAMENTALS oFPRiVATE PENSIONS 54 (6th ed. 1989); see also Rozmus,
supra note 1, at 807 n.30.
16 The opinions include two from the district court, one from the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, and of course, the Supreme Court's opinion. While this Note will generally
refer in text to the Supreme Court's decision as simply Harris Trust, for specfic references it
follows the Second Circuit's sequential numbering method, Harris Trust & Say. Bank v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1140 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct.
517 (1993), and extends that numbering scheme to include both the court of appeals and
Supreme Court opinions, to wit:
Harris I Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
722 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting partial summary judgment as to
ERISA fiduciary claims), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 970 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir.
1992), aftd, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993);
Harris 1: Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
767 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting summary judgment to defendant
insurer on plaintiff trustee's common law and contract claims and dismissing the
case), af'd, 970 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1992), af'd, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993);
Harris 1I: Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
970 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing in part as to ERISA fiduciary claims),
aef'd, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993);
Harris IV. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank,
114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
Technically, there is even a Harris V. It relates solely to discovery issues and for that reason
is excluded from further discussion in this Note. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8771 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1994).17 This Note merely introduces the notion of the related issues of the state-federal
coordination or preemption under ERISA, deeming that topic worthy of its own Note. See
supra note 12.
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analyzes the use of securities law concepts and the Court's approach to
statutory construction in this case. Part V presents the administrative response
to the case.18
I. BACKGROUND TO THE AREA
It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine comprehensively employee
benefits law, 19 ERISA's workings as the federal statutory regulator of such
benefits, 20 or the wide realm of funding arrangements available to pension
plans.2 1 Nevertheless, familiarity with the "basics" of each of these areas is
essential to an understanding of Harris Trust.
A. Pension Benefits Before ERISA-Trust and Insurance Law
Employee pension benefits originated approximately a century ago.22
Pensions originally were viewed as mere employer gratuities, and plans often
stated that no employee rights were created by the plans.33 Although such
notions soon changed, 24 the pre-ERISA legal landscape was a disunified
patchwork of trust and insurance law.25 This situation arose due to the
employers' use of both trust and annuity contract forms for the administration
of pension plans.26 The main differences27 between these two types of funding
18 See 60 Fed. Reg. 35925 (1995).
19 "Employee benefits law" includes not only retirement benefit plans, often called
"pension plans," but also health care, disability, and accident benefits. See BARBARA J.
COLEMAN, PRIMER oN ERISA at v (2d ed. 1987).
20 As to retirement benefits plans, the coverage of ERISA generally includes plans by
private employers and excludes plans by public employers and churches. 29 U.S.C. § 1003
(a), (1) (1988). For an overview of ERISA's scope and structure, see McGa.L & GRUBBS,
supra note 15, at 54-58; COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 1-9.
21 Messrs. McGill and Grubbs, for example, distinguish first between "allocated"
(contributions are credited to individual accounts for each employee) and "unallocated"
(contributions are credited to a pooled account) funding instruments. McGILL & GRUBBS,
supra note 15, at 525. The former are not relevant to this Note. Within the subset of
"allocated" funding arrangements, the commentators distinguish between "unallocated
group annuity contracts" and "trust" arrangements. Id. at 550. Unallocated group annuity
contracts, or what are generally referred to in the industry as "deposit administration
contracts," are the topic of this Note. For more on deposit administration contracts, see id.
at 551-64. For more on trust arrangements, see id. at 565-74.
22 See id. at 16.
23 Id.
24 See id. at 17-21 for a discussion of the sociological and economic theories
underlying the pension movement.
25 See id. at 47.
26 The Internal Revenue Service has required the use of the "trust" form as a
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vehicles consist of the separation of assets (trusts) versus the pooling or
commingling of assets (insurance),28 and duties based on fiduciary principles
(trusts) versus duties based on contract (insurance). 29 In this state of affairs,
"the reach of the laws and the scope of the remedies were considered by most
legal experts to be inadequate for pension plans .... Thus, there was no single
law or body of law designed to regulate the totality" 30 of private pensions.
B. ERISA-Federal Law Unifies the Law of Employee Benefits
The use of private pensions has grown dramatically in the twentieth
century. 31 Response to this growth, coupled with concern over plan
mismanagement, 32 resulted in the enactment of ERISA 33 in order "to protect
qualification for tax benefits since 1921. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107-08
(1988). However, tax law excluded from the trusteeship requirement those plans funded
exclusively by insurance annuity contracts. Id. at 1108 n.14.
27 See generally Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 478-79 (comparing trust and
insurance forms).
28 Under common trust law, trustees were required to separate assets held in trust both
from the trustee's own assets and from the assets of other trusts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 179 (1959). Under insurance contracts, other than "separate accounts"
functioning similarly to the trusts rule, contributions are commingled with the insurer's
general assets. Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 479. Professors Fischel and Langbein
explain the distinction as follows: "Unlike the stakeholding trustee who must segregate the
transferred trust property, the life insurance company is directly liable for the benefit levels
that it guarantees. In lieu of the fiduciary safeguards of trust law, the insurance beneficiary
has certain regulatory safeguards that reinforce market discipline in the industry." Fischel &
Langbein, supra note 26, at 1114 n.42 (citation omitted).
29 For a presentation of trust law fiduciary duties, see Fischel & Langbein, supra note
26, at 1113-17 (explaining a trustee's duties of stringent loyalty, prohibition against
self-dealing, regulation of compensation, nondelegation, and prudence in investing and
administration). Under an insurance arrangement, contractual promises or "guarantees" and
state insurance regulations govern the relationship. Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at
476 (noting the use of contractual promises); Id. 477 (explaining that state insurance
fiduciary regulations are "designed to assure that an insurer maintain equity among its
various constituencies").30 McGiLL & GRuBBs, supra note 15, at 48.
31 From nonexistence approximately 115 years ago, supra note 22, private pension
plans in the United States grew to include $1.6 trillion dollars in assets and 76.6 million
participants by 1987. HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION, GENERAL ACcOuNTING OFFICE,
ENFORCEMENT OF ERISA PROVISIONS, REPORT TO SUBCoMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
COMMTE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1, 2 (1989), cited in Rozmus, supra note 1, at 804 n.5.32 See MCGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 15, at 51-54 (describing the "gestation" of
ERISA); 120 CONG. REC. 29,949 (1974) ("[ERISA will eliminate the inequities and
aberrations in our private retirement system") (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
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... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans .... "34
ERISA's main features include reporting and disclosure requirements to
plan participants, 35  participation and vesting requirements, 36 'funding
requirements, 37 and penalty and enforcement procedures.38 Three concepts
fundamental to ERISA are "plan assets," 39 ERISA fiduciaries, 40 and the
fiduciary's general standard of care and specific "prohibited transactions"
rules. 41 These concepts all hearken back to the trust law side of pensions. 42
They can be visualized in terms of a garden (assets), its caretaker/gardener
(fiduciaries), and the fences around the garden (general fiduciary duties and
specific prohibited transactions).
1. The Garden: ERISA's "Plan Assets"
Determining what res or "things" 43 are included in a trust or an ERISA
33 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461)
(1988).
34 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (b). See also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 109
(1989) (stating that ERISA was enacted "to safeguard employees from the abuse and
mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to finance various types of employee
benefits").
35 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1988 & Supp. 1993). See generally MCGILL & GRUBBS,
supra note 15, at 62-67.
36 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061; see also 26 U.S.C. § 411 (1988) (listing the Internal
Revenue Code provisions for minimum vesting standards). See generally McGILL &
GRUBBS, supra note 15, at 154-61.
37 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086; see also 26 U.S.C. § 412 (listing the Internal Revenue
Code provisions for minimum funding standards).
38 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1134 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (prescribing criminal penalties,
authorizing civil enforcement, requiring claims procedures, and providing investigative
authority to the Department of Labor); id. § 1140 (protection for whistleblowers); id.
§ 1109 (prescribing liability for breach of fiduciary duties).
39 See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
40 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1104.
41 Id. § 1104 (defining the general fiduciary standard of care); id. §§ 1106-1107
(designating specific prohibited transactions); see also id. § 1108 (authorizing the
Department of Labor to promulgate exemptions from the prohibited transactions).4 2 Professors Fischel and Langbein observe that the "heart" of ERISA fiduciary law
consists of the traditional standards of care found in the common law of trusts. Fischel &
Langbein, supra note 26, at 1108. They also note: "The drafters of ERISA intended to
'apply rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law.'" Id. (quoting
CONFE-RENCE REPORT ON HR 2, PENSION REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 295, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETmEMENT INCOME
SEcuRIrrY Acr oF 1974, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4277, 4562 (1976)).
43 "Res" (literally, "thing") is the "subject matter of a trust or will." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1304 (6th ed. 1990). The subject matter of a trust could include real and
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plan is like a caretaker/gardener determining what is to be planted in the
garden. The gardener must know what will be planted in the garden before the
garden can be nurtured. This is also the case with ERISA-coverage under its
fiduciary rules extends only to plan assets. 44 Phrased another way: If a "thing"
is not a "plan asset," it is not included in ERISA's fiduciary provisions.45
The problem with the term "plan asset" is that ERISA provides no direct
definition of the term.46 Rather, Congress carved out two exclusions to the
applicability of the fiduciary rules. 47 The first exclusion relates to securities
issued to a pension plan by a registered investment company;48 the other, to
guaranteed benefit policies issued to a plan by an insurance company.49 In both
cases, plan assets include the thing issued (the security or policy itself), "but
shall not, solely by reason of" issuance, include any assets of the
issuer/insurer.50 The statute further defines "insurer" in terms of the
personal property of almost any sort. GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQurry § 269
(1937).
44 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988) (defining a "fiduciary" in terms of involvement
with plan assets); Rozmus, supra note 1, at 805 (discussing ERISA's function-based
approach to the definition of a fiduciary).
Each substantive "part" of ERISA begins with a "coverage" section. See, e.g., 29
U.S.C. § 1051 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (participation and vesting); id. § 1081 (funding); id.
§ 1101 (fiduciary rules). The references in § 1101(a) ("This part shall apply") and
§ 1101(b) ("For purposes of this part") both point to the fiduciary rules.
45 See infra part lI.B.2.
46 Harr IV, 114 S. Ct. at 524 (noting that "[tihe 'assets' of a plan are undefined
except by exclusion").
In both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress
provided detailed definitions of "security." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994) (1933 Act
definition); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934 Act definition). However, even that approach did
not thwart substantial litigation as to what types of interests are securities. For an
authoritative presentation of the statutory, regulatory, and case law components pertaining
to the determination of a security, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 14, ch.3.A.1.
47 See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).
48 Id.
49 Id. § 1101(b)(2).
50 The language of each is parallel. Compare the relevant words of the subsections:
(b)(1) ... the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such security but shall
not, solely by reason of such investment, be deemed to include any assets of such
investment company.
(b)(2)... the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such policy, but shall
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qualifications of an insurer to do business in a state5' and, of course, provides
the definition of guaranteed benefit policy at issue in Harris Trust.52
2. The CaretakerlGardeners: ERISA Fiduciaries
A trustee, as caretaker of the garden of assets, assumes the legal role of
"fiduciary." 5 3 By defining "fiduciaries" in terms of function,54 ERISA
includes a wider scope of persons than that which is included under trust law.55
ERISA requires a plan to have one or more "named fiduciaries" possessing
"authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the
plan." 56 Beyond this, however, several groups of persons are fiduciaries,
including investment advisors, 57 plan administrators with "any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility," 58 and any person who "exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control" or "any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets." 59 Thus, the list of potential
51 Id. § 1101(b)(2)(A).
5 2 Id. § 1101(b)(2)(B) (1988). For a quotation of this subsection, see supra note 6.
53 The noun "fiduciary" is defined as someone "having duty, created by his
undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such
undertaking." BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990); see also Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 26, at 1114-15 (explaining that the strict duties of a trustee emanate from the
trustee's "substitute" function).
54 The relevant language of ERISA states:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii)
he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988). For an extended discussion of ERISA fiduciary status and
its implications, see generally William L. Scogland, Fiduciary Duty: IWat Does It Mean?,
24 TORT & INS. L.I. 803 (1989).
55 Scogland, supra note 54, at 803 (noting that Congress clearly intended the term
"fiduciary" to be construed broadly).
56 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
5 7 Id. § 1002(21)(A)Ci).
5 81 Id. § 1002(21)(A)(ili).
59 Id. § 1002(21)(A)() (emphasis added). One commentator notes that the lack of the
term "discretionary" in the latter part of subsection (i) of the definition evidences legislative
desire for a very broad inclusion wherever "assets" are involved. See Rozmus, supra note
1, at 805 n.19 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary gardeners in the ERISA context can be very long and complex. 60
3. Fences Around the Garden: Fiduciary Duties and
Prohibited Transactions
Similar to trust law,61 ERISA sets an exacting level of duty for fiduciaries.
The basic rule 62 under ERISA section 404(a)(1) requires a fiduciary to act
"solely in the interest of participants" 63 and for their "exclusive benefit," 64
according to an objective "prudent man" test,65 by diversifying investments so
as to minimize large losses, unless it is prudent not to do so, 66 and in accord
with the terms of the plan.67 The main focus of this "solely-in-the-
interest/exclusive-benefit" provision, called the exclusive benefit rule,68
mirrors trust law's key rule, the duty of loyalty.69 ERISA further emphasizes
the exclusive benefit rule in the so-called "noninurement rule," 70 which states
that, subject to certain exceptions relating to insured plan termination, assets
must not inure to the benefit of employers and must benefit only the recipients
of benefits.
60 For a discussion of some of the problems of applying the fiduciary status broadly in
the employee benefits arena, see Fischel & Langbein, supra note 26, at 1117-22.
61 See Id. at 1108-10 (comparing generally ERISA fiduciary duties with the duties of
common-law trustees); see also supra notes 28-29.62 Professors Fischel and Langbein refer to 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) as the "heart" of
ERISA's fiduciary rules. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 26, at 1108. For more on ERISA
fiduciary duties, see Scogland, supra note 54, at 818-21 nn.100-13 and accompanying text.
63 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1988).
64 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
65 The statute reads:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims ....
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (prudent
administration).
66 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(); ~f RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959)
(prudent investment).
67 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
68 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 26, at 1108.
69 Id.; cf RESTATM M (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) (duty of loyalty).
70 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988). For more on the noninurement rule, see Fischel &
Langbein, supra note 26, at 1149-54 (discussing the workings of the noninurement rule in
certain termination situations).
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ERISA goes beyond these general standards, however, and sets additional
limitations (fences around the garden) in the form of prohibited transaction
rules. 71 On one hand, these rules flatly prohibit certain types of transactions72
between the plan, its assets, and a widely-defined group of "parties in
interest." 73 Additional rules relating more generally to self-dealing, or conflicts
of interest transactions between the plan and fiduciaries, further fence in the
garden of assets.74 Notably, a fiduciary may not "deal with the assets of the
plan in his own interest or for his own account .... " 75 Absent an exemption
from Congress or the Department of Labor,76 any such transaction-even
though beneficial to the plan-is banned. 77 Prohibited transactions have
particular application in employee benefit insurance plans such as in Harris
Trust, since countless transactions may fall outside the garden fence of what is
permissible.
In summary, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA provide an intricate system
for protecting employee benefits. With this system in mind, it is next
appropriate to turn to the history of the Harris Trust case.
HX. BACKGROUND TO HARRS TRusT
This Part presents the historical background to the case. Section A focuses
on the factual history. Section B turns to the lower court decisions in Harris
Trust.
A. Developments Between the Parties Prior to Litigation
The pre-litigation history of Harris Trust spans several decades and
71 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106. For a presentation of the prohibited transactions rules, see
Scogland, supra note 54, at 823-24. For more on the implications of the prohibited
transactions rules in the insurer context, see Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 477.
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A)-(E) (prohibiting, inter alia, the sale/exchange/lease
of property, lending of money, extension of credit, transfer of any plan assets, or the
acquisition of certain real property or securities of the employer).
73 See id. § 1002(14) (defining "party in interest" to include, inter alia, the fiduciary,
providers of services to the plan, employers, relatives of these three groups, employee
organizations connected with the plan, and certain majority stockholders of entities related
to any of these groups).
74 See id. §§ 1106(b)-(c) (prohibiting self-dealing, dealing with parties of adverse
interest, and certain stock or real property transactions).
75 Id. § 1106(b)(1).
76 See id. § 1108 (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to establish regulations providing
exemptions from the operation of the prohibited transaction rules).




contractual amendments. It is helpful to divide this era into four phases: (1) the
original agreement; (2) the 1968 amendment; (3) the 1977 amendment; and (4)
the period from 1977 until 1983, when litigation commenced.
1. The Original Contract (1941-67)
In 1941, the Sperry Corporation78 contracted with John Hancock for the
provision of retirement benefits for Sperry employees. 79 The contract, known
as Group Annuity Contract No. 50 ("GAC 50"),80 was a deferred annuity
contract81 under which Sperry purchased, through annual premiums,8 2 deferred
annuities for employees which Hancock would pay on upon an employee's
retirement.83
2. The IPG Amendment (1968-77)
The first relevant change84 in the Hancock/Sperry contract occurred in
1968,85 when the policy changed to a Retrospective Immediate Participation
Guarantee ("retro-IPG") form. 86 Under this arrangement, two bookkeeping
accounts recorded debits against the plan (called Liabilities of Fund or
"LOF") 87 and credits to the plan (called Pension Administration Fund or
"PAF"). 88 Credits to the PAF came from employer contributions and from the
plan's pro rata "participation" 89 in the insurer's net positive experience.90 In
78 In 1986, the Sperry Corporation and the Burroughs Corporation merged to form the
Unisys Corporation, the successor to Sperry-Rand or "Sperry" throughout the opinions.
Harris I, 722 F. Supp. at 999 n.1.
79 Id.
80 "Harris Trust is the present trustee of the [pension] and the ultimate successor to
Sperry's rights as contraetholder of GAC 50." Harris I1, 970 F.2d at 1140.
81 A deferred annuity contract is an "agreement in which the terms require payment to
begin after a certain period of time has elapsed ...." BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 421 (6th
ed. 1990). An annuity is the "right to receive fixed, periodic payments, either for life or for
a term of years." Id. at 90. See generally McGiLL & GRUBBS, supra note 15, at 545-49
(explaining the workings of group deferred annuity contracts).82 Haris II, 767 F. Supp. at 1272.
83 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
84 Haris H, 767 F. Supp. at 1272 n.2.
85 Hanis HI, 970 F.2d at 1141.
86 For more on this type of contract, see MCGiLL & GRUBBS, supra note 15, at 562-
64; Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 478-82.
87 The Supreme Court describes an LOF simply as a "liabilities" account. Harris IV,
114 S. Ct. at 522.
88 The Court describes a PAF as an "assets" account. Id.
89 See Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1000. Greatly simplified, "participation" works as
follows: Insurer calculates its overall investment experience, prorates the plan's share of
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reality this was a minor change, because Hancock had previously "distributed
such net experience to the contract holder as dividends." 91 Conversely,
Hancock effectively guaranteed that the PAF would not drop below its January
1, 1968 level, thus protecting the fund from erosion due to negative insurer
experience.92 This was required because preexisting annuities were "technically
canceled," 93 and the assets supporting them deposited into the PAF account. 94
Hancock further guaranteed the payment of annuities to employees "once an
employee's retirement annuity [was] established." 95
The LOF documented not only present liabilities, but was also "the
contractual reserve for the possible future purchase of annuities for the benefit
obligations guaranteed by Hancock." 96 The court in Harris I explained the
provision of new benefits and the interrelation of the two accounts as follows:
[U]pon an eligible employee's retirement Hancock would determine, pursuant
to rate tables contained in GAC 50, the amount by which the... LOF would
increase if that portion of the employee's retirement benefit accruing in the
period after January 1, 1968 were to be guaranteed by Hancock. If GAC 50's
PAF balance exceeded the contract's Minimum Operating Level ("MOL")
(equal to 105% of its LOF), based upon this increased LOF, Hancock would
guarantee the payment of the additional benefits. If the amount of the PAF fell
below the amount of the LOF ... H ancock could ask Sperry for a
contribution. 97
The MOL not only determined in part the need for contribution, but also
affected contract termination. 98 Termination would occur if Sperry failed to
"maintain" the PAF at or above the 105% MOL level. Upon termination, the
participation in such experience, and then compares that amount with the contract's stated
interest and expense rates. If the prorated net actual experience exceeds the contractually
projected rate, the appropriate credit is made to the PAF. See Goldberg & Altman, supra
note 10, at 480. For a more technical explanation of the same, see MCGILL & GRUBBS,
supra note 15, at 553-55.
9 0 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1000. "Net positive experience" takes into account
positive factors such as investment/asset income and lower than anticipated mortality
experience, and negative factors (for example, expenses, investment non-successes, and
higher than expected policy payouts). See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 480.
91 Harris 11, 767 F. Supp. at 1272 n.3.
9 2 See Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1000 (explaining how the fund would not drop below
1968 level); Harris 11I, 970 F.2d at 1141 (restating the effective guarantee of non-loss).




97 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1000-01 (footnotes omitted).
9 8 Id. at 1001.
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contract would revert to the prior deferred annuity form, and "canceled"
annuities would be "repurchased." 99
3. The 1977Amendment
Between 1968 and 1977, Sperry officials observed that similar funds
managed by other investment managers, including a separate account managed
for Sperry by Hancock, provided greater returns than GAC 50.100 This
prompted Sperry to seek to "remove funds from Hancock's General Account
and place them in other funds over which it could exercise more investment
control"' 0 ' in a way that avoided charges under the contract's Asset
Liquidation Adjustment ("ALA"). 102 The 1977 amendment sought to
accomplish this in two ways. First, the LOF calculation performed upon an
employee's retirement no longer occurred automatically as it had from 1968
through 1977.103 Rather, Sperry could choose to request that Hancock establish
guaranteed benefits. 104 Sperry never made such a request. 10 5 Second, Sperry
could use excess funds in the PAF (designated "free funds" during the course
of the litigation)' ° 6 to provide retirement benefits directly on a nonguaranteed
basis. 107 The desire to use free funds for "pay-as-you-go" benefits and the
concern for access or control over those free funds without triggering the ALA
occurred because the PAF had grown much more than either Harris or
Hancock had anticipated. 108
4. Problems Arise (1977-83)
The "use of free funds" issue following 1977 precipitated the lawsuit by
99 See Harris 11I, 970 F.2d at 1141-42.
100 Harris 11, 767 F. Supp. at 1274.
101 Id.
102 See id. One analysis refers to this type of clause as a "surrender charge." Goldberg
& Altman, supra note 10, at 479. For the district court's explanation of the calculation




106 Hanis IV, 114 S. Ct. at 522.
107 As the Supreme Court aptly explains: "These benefits were provided monthly on a
pay-as-you-go basis; they were nonguaranteed in the sense that Hancock was obligated to
make payments only out of free funds; i.e., only when the balance in the Pension
Administration Fund exceeded the Minimum Operating Level." Id.
108 Justice Thomas notes: "The Pension Administration Fund, and thus the free funds,
had grown beyond the parties' expectations." Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 537 (Thomas, L,
dissenting).
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Harris Trust (as trustee for the Sperry Plan) against John Hancock. 109 First,
Sperry requested, and Hancock agreed, to transfer funds from GAC 50's
PAF-without an ALA charge-to another GAC that needed contributions.110
Sperry also requested two additional "rollover" withdrawals of free funds.11i
After Hancock permitted such a transfer in 1979,112 three things occurred:
first, Hancock's coporate policy was amended in 1980 to deny rollovers except
for grandfathered customers; second, Hancock allowed in 1981 a rollover for
the year 1980; and third, Hancock eliminated rollovers entirely in 1981.113
This blocked Harris's access to free funds for "pay-as-you-go."
In 1982, a second precipitating event occurred when Sperry requested
Hancock to add a new division of Sperry employees to those already receiving
"nonguaranteed" benefits from GAC 50's free funds. 114 The parties disagreed
as to the meaning of contractual language on point, whereupon Hancock
exercised a contractual right and "gave [Sperry/Harris Trust] 31 days notice in
writing that it would terminate all such [nonguaranteed or "free-funds"]
payments." 1 5 Approximately one year later, Harris Trust, as trustee for the
Retirement Plan, filed suit.116 Thus began the ten-year court battle of Harris
Trust.
B. The Lower Courts in Harris Trust
Harris Trust alleged two types of claims: breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA and a variety of contractual and common-law claims. 1 7 The trial court
so divided the issues and granted Hancock's motions for summary judgment in
both instances. 118 Because Harris II deals only with the non-ERISA claims, its
opinion is not analyzed in this Note.' 9
109 See supra note 80.
110 Harris H, 767 F. Supp. at 1274.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1274-75.
114 See id. at 1276 (calling this a "significant event which preceded Hancock's alleged
breach").
115 Id.
116 Harris 111, 970 F.2d at 1142.
117 Harris I, 722 F. Supp. at 999 (describing Harris Trust's suit as "alleging breaches
of contract, breaches of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, unjust enrichment and
assorted violations" of ERISA).
118 See id. at 1020; Harris 11, 767 F. Supp. at 1284.
119 "By its opinion ... , this Court dismissed plaintiffs claim asserted under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act .... This motion relates to plaintiffs contract
and common law claims." Harris 1I, 767 F. Supp. at 1272.
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1. Harris I: iduciary Status Inapplicable to Hancock
In Hanis I, the district court ruled that Hancock was not a fiduciary under
ERISA with respect to the part of Hancock's general account funds deemed
"free funds" 120 because the court held that ERISA's guaranteed benefits policy
exemption was applicable to GAC 50.121 That holding is the primary concern
of the present discussion. However, two peripheral matters merit mention.
First, the court rejected Hancock's argument that ERISA's "savings" clause122
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act123 excluded Hancock from ERISA. 124 Under
principles of "traditional preemption analysis," 125 the court ruled in favor of
dual federal-state regulation for insurers dealing in pensions.126 Next,
preclusion was held inapplicable to a prior district court ruling withdrawn and
vacated pursuant to settlement. 127
The trial court then turned to the guaranteed benefits policy exemption
issue.' 28 The court announced a broad approach to its reading of the statute.' 29
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg later used the same quote in reaching a
conclusion opposite that of the trial court. 130
Harris first argued that the contract constituted an investment contract, not
an insurance contract.' 31 This argument is based largely on Judge Richard
Posner's opinion in Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 132 wherein the Seventh Circuit addressed a contract
similar to GAC 50.133 Plaintiff's allegations included a breach of fiduciary duty
120 See Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1020.
121 Id. at 1019.
122 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
123 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1994). Broadly speaking, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
prescribes the insurance industry to state regulation. For more on the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, see KEETON& WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 931-37 (1988).124 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1006.
125 Id. at 1003.
126 "If the ... state laws that govern Hancock's behavior relate to employee benefit
plans and regulate the business of insurance, the laws would survive ERISA preemption.
The state statutes and ERISA would both apply to the insurer's activities." Id. at 1004
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).127 Id. at 1011.
128 Id. at 1011-20.
129 Id. at 1012 ("in expounding a statute, we [are] not.., guided by a single sentence
or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy") (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
13 0 See Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at523 (Ginsburg, J.).
131 Harris I, 722 F. Supp. at 1013.
132 698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
133 See id. at 322-23. The type of contract involved in Peoria Union was a "deposit
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under ERISA, securities fraud under federal and state law, and related
common-law claims 134 in connection with discrepancies between figures
disclosed by the defendant/insurer and the insurer's internal summaries relating
to the same account. 135 On appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, 136 the Seventh Circuit considered whether the contract was an
investment contract to which federal securities law would apply. 137 In dealing
with the securities allegations, Judge Posner, relying on two Supreme Court
securities cases dealing with variable annuities, 138 divided the contract into
functional phases 139 and examined each phase for investment risk allocation. 140
Deciding that a claim was stated under securities law, 141 Judge Posner turned
to the ERISA claim and ERISA's guaranteed benefit policy exemption, noting
that "Congress did not want to make an insurance company that sells a
standard annuity contract-one that provides 'benefits the amount of which is
guaranteed by the insurer'-a fiduciary toward the purchaser of the
contract." 142 He then immediately applied the identical investment contract
analysis and came to the conclusion that the exemption did not apply to the
contract. 143
administration contract," of which the IPG contract in Harris Trust is a type. See MCGILL &
GRUBBs, supra note 15, at 562-64 (explaining that IPG's are offshoots of conventional
DAC's and discussing differences).
134 Peoria Union, 698 F.2d at 322. Judge Posner noted that the case was before him
only on "the complaint and attached documents, which constitute the entire factual record in
this case.. . ." Id. at 326.
135 See id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 324. Federal securities law defines "security" to include "investment
contract." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1), 78c(a)(10) (1994). For more on securities law and
investment contracts, see Loss & SELIUGMAN, supra note 14, ch.3.A.l.d (1993).
138 See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (VALIC). For a discussion of these
cases, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 14, ch.3.A.1.f (1993).
139 Peoria Union, 698 F.2d at 325 (citing United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 207).
140 Id. at 324-25 ("[W]e conclude that the concept of 'insurance' involves some
investment risk-taking on the part of the company.") (citing VALIC, 359 U.S. at 71).
141 Id. at 326.
142 Id. at 327.
143 The court's language following the prior quote reads as follows:
But that is not what Penn Mutual sold here. The pension trustees did not buy an
insurance contract with a fixed payout; they turned over the assets of the pension plan
to Penn Mutual to manage with full investment discretion, subject only to a modest
income guaranty. If the pension plan had hired an investment advisor and given him
authority to buy and sell securities at his discretion for the plan's account, the advisor
would be a fiduciary within the meaning of the act, and that is essentially what the
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Applying the Peoria Union framework to GAC 50, Judge Patterson
rejected Harris Trust's argument on two grounds. On the one hand, the court
generally questioned the applicability of the securities-based analysis to
ERISA 144 and, more specifically, the Seventh Circuit's extension of SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co.145 to benefits contracts guaranteeing payment to
the employee.146 On the other hand, the court reasoned that even if Peoria
Union did apply, Harris Trust's allegations of "illusory risk" to Hancock
"misconstrued" the Supreme Court cases underlying Peoria Union, since those
cases were concerned with "the transfer of risk from insured to insurer, not
simply the nature of the risk the insurer might bear." 147 Looking at the
underlying fact situation, the court found that Hancock did in fact bear actual
risks. 148 The court also observed: "In sum, Harris Trust seems to be arguing
that in hindsight, it does not like the bargain that it once struck. That argument
should not change the terms of its contract, provided the covered employees are
not prejudiced." 149 Additionally, the court noted that the terms "benefit" and
"payment" in ERISA consistently refer to the actual payments to employees,
not to employers. 150 Because GAC 50 did provide guaranteed fixed payments
to employees, the exemption applied. 151
In holding that Hancock's general account was not a plan asset, and that
therefore Hancock was not a fiduciary,' 52 the court found support in both the
trustees did during the accumulation phase of the contract ....
Id. at 327. Compare Goldberg & Altman, supra note 15, at 488-90 (asserting that the
bifurcation adopted in Peoria Union contravened both the language and policy of the
guaranteed policy benefit exemption) with Rozmus, supra note 1, at 812-13 (discussing the
case and conceding that the Seventh Circuit made only a "scant examination" of the
exemption) and with id. at 825-27 (defending the Peoria Union result).
144 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1015 n.25 ("Peoria's holding as to the contract's
exemption from the securities laws should not require the same result as to ERISA.").
145 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
146 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
147 Id. at 1016.
148 Id. at 1016-17 (including as actual risks of Hancock: (1) the guarantee of
payments; (2) the possibility of reversion and repurchase and concommitant loss; and (3)
miscalculation as to rates of interest and mortality).
149 Id. at 1017.
150 Id. at 1017-18. The court's use of "employer" may seem misplaced, but a close
reading of the entire paragraph makes it clear that the the court used the term in that
context, analogously to "contractholder." See id.
151 Id. at 1018.
152 The court concluded that
the sole passage in the legislative history that deals with the guaranteed benefit policy
exception ... confirms that while Congress did intend ERISA's fiduciary sections to
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legislative history of ERISA, 153 and a Department of Labor Interpretive
Bulletin ("IB 75-2"), later codified as a Department of Labor regulation. 154
The court did not give weight to two Department of Labor opinion letters
contravening IB 75-2.155 Harris Trust also argued that Hancock was a fiduciary
as to the contract itself, not just to free funds. 156 The court noted that the
contract itself was a plan asset but found that "only the contractholder, not the
issuer," was a fiduciary as to that asset.157
This exposition of the district court's first opinion laid the groundwork for
the court of appeals and Supreme Court opinions, as the arguments therein
remained essentially the same.
2. Harris Il: Reversal on the ERISA Issue by the Second Circuit
As stated earlier in Harris 11,158 the district court also granted summary
cover variable annuity contracts, Congress did not intend to hold an insurer to a
fiduciary standard if the contract it issues provides for fixed payments to the plan
beneficiary.
Id. at 1017.
153 The House Report (the "sole passage") explains that "[i]f the policy guarantees basic
payments but other payments may vary with, e.g., investment performance, then the
variable part of the policy and the assets attributable thereto are not to be considered as
guaranteed, and are to be considered as plan assets subject to the fiduciary rules." JOINT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMTTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5077, quoted in Harris I, 722 F.
Supp. at 1017.
154 The court cites, inter alia, to Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 75-2, later
adopted as a regulation, dealing with prohibited transactions. The relevant section reads as
follows:
(b) Contracts or policies of insurance. If an insurance company issues a contract
or policy of insurance to a plan and places the consideration for such contract or policy
in its general asset account, the assets in such account shall not be considered to be
plan assets. Therefore, a subsequent transaction involving the general asset account
between a party in interest and the insurance company will not, solely because the plan
has been issued such a contract or policy of insurance, be a prohibited transaction.
ERISA Interpretative Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoted in
Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1018). This section was relied upon by both the Department of
Labor and the insurance industry generally as a clarification of the guaranteed policy benefit
exception. See Goldberg & Altman, supra note 10, at 484--86.
155 See id. at 1018-19.
156 See id. at 1019-20.
157 Id. at 1019.
158 See supra text accompanying note 118.
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judgment to Hancock on the plaintiff's contractual and common-law claims. 159
Confronting an appeal of the ERISA claims of Harris 160 and a contract claim
from Harris ff,161 the Second Circuit reversed in part. The court found
fiduciary status as to the PAF's "free funds" 162 but not as to the contract
itself.163 The court then affirmed both the nonpreclusive effect of a prior
vacated judgment 164 and the district court's dismissal of the contract claim. 16 5
The court of appeals first focused on the "to the extent that" language of
the exemption, 166 stating that "a contract is a guaranteed benefit policy only 'to
the extent' that it provides for benefits that an insurer guarantees." 167 The court
adopted the bifurcation analysis of Peoria Union168 and decided that Hancock
guaranteed only "one portion" of the contract's benefits, namely not the "free
funds" portion, which the court described as "dependent upon the insurer's
investment experience and therefore... variable with respect to the benefits it
provides." 169 The court found support for that view in a different reading of
the conference report relied upon by the district court170 and in Judge Posner's
characterization of the contract in Peoria Union, namely that the contract was
like employing an investment advisor. 171
Though noting the district court's observation that the term "benefits" in
ERISA "refers to benefits and payments to covered employees" and not to the
employer or the plan itself, 172 the Second Circuit nevertheless viewed the
lower court outcome as flawed173 because "at certain times, until there is a
conversion to guaranteed benefits, Hancock is managing assets taken in under
159 Harris 11, 767 F. Supp. at 1284.
160 Technically the fiduciary duty breach had two parts: breach of fiduciary duty
relating to free funds (the surplus in the PAF), and breach of fiduciary duty as to the
contract itself See Harris 111, 970 F.2d at 1148.
161 Harris 111, 970 F.2d at 1140. The claim essentially alleged that Hancock's
termination of the "free fund" non-guaranteed benefit payments was a breach of contract.
162 Seeid. at 1142-45.
163 See id. at 1145-46; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text.
16 4 Id. at 1146; see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
165 Id. at 1146-48.
166 For the relevant statutory language, see supra note 6.
167 Harris 111, 970 F.2d at 1143 (emphasis added).
168 See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peoria
Union case.169 Harfis II, 970 F.2d at 1143.
170 This same language is cited by the district court in reaching the opposite
conclusion. See supra note 133.
171 Harris 111, 970 F.2d at 1143.
172 Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1017-18; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
173 Har&11, 970 F.2d at 1144.
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GAC 50 as to which there are no guarantees." 174 The court of appeals made
this statement in response to a quote from the district court's opinion which
spoke of Hancock's guarantees and risks. 175 A close reading of these passages
reveals an implied rejection of the district court's reading of "benefits" as
referring to those payments guaranteed by the insurer. The source of the
concern seems to lie with the post-1977 use of PAF funds to provide
"nonguaranteed" 176 benefits.
The court of appeals accepted the Department of Labor Advisory Opinions
rejected by the district court, albeit ignoring the express limitations contained in
those letters. 177 The court resolved the conflict between the letters and IB 75-2
by stating that the Interpretive Bulletin "was designed to deal with prohibited
transactions in regard to conflict of interest situations.... There is no
inconsistency in considering certain assets to be plan assets for general
fiduciary duty purposes but not for prohibited transactions purposes."178 The
court of appeals concluded that Hancock's general account was not excluded
under the guaranteed benefit policy language of ERISA.179
IlI. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Hancock appealed on the "fiduciary as to free funds" issue, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.180 Ruling in favor of Harris Trust, the Court
held that the free funds in GAC 50 were plan assets and, as such, subjected
Hancock's actions "in regard to their management and disposition" to ERISA's
fiduciary standards. 181 Section A of this Part examines the majority opinion.
Section B reviews the dissent of Justice Thomas.
174 Id.
175 Id.; see supra notes 148-49.
176 The use of the term "nonguaranteed" proved unfortunate to Hancock. See
supra note 151 and accompanying text.
177 The district court rejected these private opinion letters because the letters were
expressly limited to the parties and facts adressed by the letters, and because ERISA
Procedure so limits the scope of the Advisory Opinions. See Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1019.
17 8 Harris 11, 970 F.2d at 1145. As will be discussed at greater length below, see infra
notes 219-27 and accompanying text, this harmonization is strained. The prohibited
transactions rules are fundamentally part and parcel of ERISA fiduciary law, and in fact are
the main ways by which the general duties made concrete in the legislation.
179 Harris I1, 970 F.2d at 1145.
180 113 S. Ct. 1576 (1993).
181 HarrisIV, 114 S. Ct. at 529.
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A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for a 6-3 majority,182 Justice Ginsburg first stated a "wide-angle"
standard of statutory review similar to that taken by the district court,183 stating
that the Court was "guided not by 'a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look[ed] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy.'' 81 4 After reviewing basic ERISA definitions and the guaranteed
benefit policy exemption, Justice Ginsburg characterized their meaning as "not
mellifluous" 185 but "reasonably clear" when taken together. 186 In sum, she
found the exemption to be "markedly confined" in comparison to other ERISA
provisions, 187 focusing on the "words of limitation," as did the court of
appeals.188 Ginsburg concluded: "Congress has specifically instructed, by the
words of limitation it used, that we closely contain the guaranteed benefit
policy exclusion." 189
The Court next addressed the preemption argument, 190 affirming that a
dual state-federal regulation scheme was proper, with ERISA trumping in the
case of irreconcilable conflict. 191 Turning to Hancock's fiduciary status under
ERISA as to general account funds, the Court decided to "follow the lead" 192
of Peoria Union by examining the contract under securities law. 193 The Peoria
Union framework first divides the contract into functional components
("accumulation" and "payout" phases), 194 then analyzes the components for
182 Id. at 517. Justice Thomas authored the dissent in which Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy joined. Id. at 531.
183 Id. at 523; see Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1012; see also supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
184 Haris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 523 (citations omitted).
185 "Mellifluous" means flowing like honey. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcrboNARY
268 (School and Office ed. 1971). This term is unique to Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
author did locate, however, 15 uses of the term in other federal court opinions, as of
February 12, 1995, referring (usually in the negative) to statutes.
186 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 524.
187 Id. ("Notably, the guaranteed benefit policy exemption is not available to 'any'
insurance contract that provides for guaranteed benefits but only 'to the extent that' the
contract does so.").
188 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
189 HarisIV, 114 S. Ct. at 525.
190 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
191 Id. at 526.
192 Id. at 527.
193 For a discussion of Peoria Union, see supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
194 Hanis IV, 114 S. Ct. at 527-28. This approach originated in United Benefit, 387
U.S. at 202 (holding that an annuity contract, for purposes of exemption from the Securities
Act of 1933, could be deemed a nonexempt investment contract prior to the commencement
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the investment risk allocation. 195 In deeming this analysis correct
"because... the exemption applies only 'to the extent that' a policy or
contract provides for 'benefits the amount of which is guaranteed,'"'196 the
Court focused its attention on whether the plan received a fixed rate of
return.197 The Court reiterated this focus on the plan by describing the two
situations with which it did not take issue. First, benefits "for which entries
have actually been made in the Liabilities of the Fund" account, even during
the accumulation phase, were within the exemption. 198 Second, if there was an
end to the accumulation phase, i.e., if termination were triggered, 199 "all
benefits thereafter payable under the contract" would also be covered by the
exemption.2°° In other words, the Court's only concern was with free funds
during the active or accumulation phase, and the extent to which Hancock
guaranteed a rate of return to the plan.
In looking at the administration of free funds during the active phase,
several factors drew the Court's attention. First, the Court found it
"undisputed" that to the extent of the 1977 amendment's reference to
"nonguaranteed" benefits, 20' "GAC 50 [did] not fall within the statutory
exemption." 202 Additionally, the Court saw features in GAC 50 which were
reminiscent of the variable annuity in United Benefit, namely the "investment
participation" feature of GAC 50 after 1968,203 and the determination that
"until the occurrence of a triggering event ... the investment risk is borne
primarily by the contractholder." 204 These factors led the Court to decide, as
did the Seventh Circuit in Peoria Union, that free funds during the
accumulation were held by Hancock as an investment manager, not as an
of payout (the "accumulation" phase) and an exempt insurance contract after the start of
payments (the "payout" phase)). See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
195 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 527 ("[Ihe concept of 'insurance' involves... risk-taking
on the part of the company," and "'involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of the
benefits will be payable in fixed amounts.'") (quoting VALIC, 359 U.S. at 71).
196 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 527.
197 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993) ("The term 'guaranteed benefit
policy' means an insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or contract
provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer. Such term includes
any surplus in a separate account, but excludes any other portion of a separate account.").
198 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 527-28.
199 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text for more on termination.
200 HarrisIV, 114 S. Ct. at 528.
201 Id. See supra notes 95-96 and note 101 and accompanying text for the factual
background relating to nonguaranteed benefits payable from the PAF and plaintiff's
displeasure upon defendant's cancellation of those payments.
2 02 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 528.
203 See supra notes 86-95 for an explanation of the participation feature.
204 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 528.
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insurer.205 The Court even quoted Peoria Union to that effect.2 6 Thus, the
Court concluded that the discretionary management of assets during a contract
phase where no fixed rate of returns is provided and where no payments are
guaranteed gives rise to ERISA fiduciary status.207
The Court next responded to Hancock's "provides for" argument.20 8
Hancock argued that the right of Harris Trust to purchase guaranteed benefits
from free funds during any time meant that the contract provided for
guaranteed benefits. 209 Hancock made this argument in reliance on Mack
Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffiltt21 which held that the "provide for"
language of the exemption was satisfied if the funds provided for guaranteed
benefits "'at some finite point in the future.'" 21' The Supreme Court rejected
this reading, noting that the phrase "to the extent," as words of limitation,
meant "only 'to the extent,'" as opposed to the word "if," which would signify
a blanket exemption, and which would be how the Court would expect the
statute to be drafted if Hancock's view were to prevail. 212 Two features
evidenced a lack of guarantee to the Court: (1) the PAF level was guaranteed
only to its January 1, 1968 level; and (2) Hancock could set the price for
converting free funds from the PAF to guaranteed benefits. 213
Hancock also argued that the free funds did not fall under ERISA's term
"benefits" because ERISA defines benefits solely in terms of payments to
participants. 214 The Court read this definition to mean not that the free funds
fall outside the realm of plan assets, but rather that "[a] contract component
that provides for something other than guaranteed payments to plan participants
205 Id.
206 Id. (quoting Peoria Union, 698 F.2d at 327). See supra note 143 for the quotation.
207 See Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 528 (quoting Harris I1, 970 F.2d at 1144).
208 Id.
209 See Brief for Petitioner at 26, Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. 517.
210 930 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1991).
211 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 528 (quoting Mack Boring, 930 F.2d at 273).
2 12 Id. at 528-29 (emphasis added). The Court stated:
Congress did not say a contract is exempt "if" it provides for guaranteed benefits; it
said a contract is exempt only "to the extent" it so provides. Using these words of
limitation, Congress apparently recognized that contracts may provide to some extent
for something other than guaranteed benefits, and expressly declared the exemption
unavailable to that extent.
Id. The Court almost always writes "only 'to the extent'" when it speaks what it calls the
"words of limitation." For more on this semantic construction, see infra notes 278-79 and
accompanying text.
213 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 529.
2 14 Id.; see also Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 998, 1017-18 (citing various sections of
Title 29 of the United States Code).
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or beneficiaries-e.g., a guaranteed return to the plan-does not, without more,
provide for guaranteed benefits and thus does not fall within the statutory
exclusion." 215 In other words, "guarantee" includes a current guaranteed rate
of return on free funds and a guaranteed conversion price, because that lack of
such guarantees "undeniably" exposes participants to the risk that "the future
amount of benefits-payments to participants and beneficiaries-attributable to
the free funds can fall to zero." 216 The Court concluded that any contract
"component" (phase) which does not allocate investment risk, defined as "a
genuine guarantee of an aggregate amount of benefits" does not fall within the
exemption, and that the indicators which are "key" with regard to free funds
are (1) the guarantee of a reasonable rate of return, and (2) a conversion price
set by the contract. 217 Since GAC 50 failed this test as to free funds, the free
funds were deemed plan assets to which ERISA's fiduciary rules attached. 218
Finally, the Court turned to Hancock's reliance on the Department of
Labor's B 75-2,219 holding that the bulletin did not apply because it spoke
only about prohibited transactions with parties in interest and not about the
guaranteed benefit policy exemption itself. 220 The Department of Labor's
attack on the Second Circuit's distinction between "assets for general fiduciary
purposes" versus "assets for prohibited transactions purposes" also failed
because, again, B 75-2 did not specifically deal with the issue.221 IB 75-2
would have needed to address the "to the extent" language of the statute if it
had meant to provide "an unqualified exclusion for an insurer's general asset
account."222 Further, the failure of the Department of Labor to provide an
amicus brief to the Second Circuit223 was an indication to the Court that the
Department of Labor had no "firm position" on the issue.224 Also, reliance on
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.225 was
inapplicable because, in the majority's view, the words "to the extent" were
impermissibly interpreted to mean the broader "if" by the Department of





219 Id. at 529-31. For more on this argument, see supra notes 154-55 and 177-79 and
accompanying text.




224 Id. at 531.
225 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth the circumstances under which a court will defer
to executive branch agencies).
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Labor.226 The Court also rejected the Department of Labor's concern for
insurer disruptions, costs, and exposure to future litigation and referred the
Department of Labor and Hancock to the "remedies" of statutory change or to
"administrative relief [from the Department of Labor] ... to facilitate insurers'
compliance with the law .... "227
B. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas's basic premise was that the majority's focus on the shift of
investment risk was misplaced, 228 and that the focus should instead have been
on "whether, and to what extent" guaranteed benefits were provided. 229 In
considering the term "provide for," Thomas adopted the view that "a contract
can 'provide for' guaranteed benefits before it actually guarantees future
payouts-that is, before it shifts the investment risk as to those benefits to the
insurer."230
Thomas preferred not to go beyond the "plain language" of the statute,
assuming that "Congress 'says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says.'" 23 1 He disregarded the need to look to ERISA policy 23 2 or to
"principles derived from the interpretation of dissimilar provisions" of
securities law. 23 3 In fact, Thomas viewed these sources as causing a "gloss" by
the majority that overreached the clear language of the statute.23 4
In analyzing the statute, Thomas saw two basic requirements: (1) that the
contract provide for guaranteed benefits, 23 5 and (2) that the "amount" of the
benefits be guaranteed. 23 6 As to the "provide for" requirement, Justice Thomas
felt that the meaning to be attached to this statutorily undefined term should be
read according to its "ordinary speech" meaning. 23 7 Under an ordinary speech
view, the term means "make a provision for"-a notion concerned with the
2 26 HarrisIV, 114 S. Ct. at 531.2 27 Id.
228 See id. at 531-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 532.
230 Id.
231 Id. (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).2 32 See id. at 532, 534-35 (arguing against the majority's inclusion of broader ERISA
policy, and asserting that Congress could have, but did not, mean to insulate plans from all
risk, contrary to the majority view).
233 Id. at 532, 534 (arguing against the majority's use of a securities law analogy and
noting that the issue in both securities cases-whether an annuity was insurance or
investment-was not at issue in Harris Trust).
23 4 Id. at 534.
235 Id. at 532-33.
236 Id. at 533.
23 7 Id. at 532.
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future rather than the immediate. 23 8 In other words, a current contractual
promise or plan for flture guaranteed benefits, as opposed to a current
guarantee of the amounts of future payments, meets the statute's "provide for"
language.23 9 Paralleling the majority,240 Justice Thomas also provided a
version of how the statute would have been drafted had Congress meant what
the majority claimed, namely "to the extent that benefits, the amount of which
is guaranteed by the insurer, are vested in plan participants."241
As to the amount of benefits, the dissent argued that by looking at the
returns to the plan as a whole, as opposed to payments to individual
participants,242 the majority placed a gloss on the statute that was "nowhere
mentioned [by Congress] ... despite the obvious superiority" of terms such as
"allocation of risk, fixed payouts, or guaranteed investment returns." 243
Maintaining its focus on guarantees to employees, the dissent noted that it is the
plan, not the policy, which sets the amount of benefits to be received. 244 The
dissent further distinguished such a plan from one where "participants received
either variable benefits or fixed benefit payments that were not guaranteed." 245
If the policy guarantees its benefits, as does the first example, then "a variable
return to the plan entails no such risk for plan participants." 246 While agreeing
with Ginsburg that "to the extent" does not mean "if," the dissent nonetheless
contended that a focus on allocation of investment risk misstates the issue by
looking beyond benefits guaranteed to employees to a guaranteed aggregate
return.247
Though Thomas acknowledged the trust/fiduciary-insurance/contract
dichotomy as well as insurers' industry-wide reliance on the Department of
Labor's prior interpretation (albeit without addressing the majority's arguments
as to the scope of B 75-2),248 he did not give these factors "dispositive
238 Id. (citing Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187, 2192-93 (1993) (interpreting "provide"
in a Bankruptcy Code section) and BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1224 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"provide" as "to make, procure, orffurnishforfiaure use, prepare") (emphasis added)).
23 9 Id. (citing Mack Boring & Parts Co. v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, 930 F.2d 267,
273 (3d Cir. 1991)). "If 'provide for' is construed in this way, the insurance contract need
not guarantee the benefits for any particular plan participant until the benefits have vested,
so long as it makes provision for the payment of guaranteed benefits in the future." Id.24 0 See supra text accompanying note 212.
241 Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
24 2 See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
24 3 Haris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 533-34.
24 4 See id. at 535 n.4.
245 Id. at 534.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 535.
248 Id. at 535-36.
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weight." 249 Rather, he counseled great caution, noting that the majority's
decision was far-reaching, because "[t]he free funds are not identifiable assets
at all, but are simply an accounting entry in Hancock's books.... To impose
fiduciary duties with respect to the management of the free funds is essentially
to impose fiduciary duties on the management of the entire line of [Hancock's
group pension] business." 250
Finally, looking directly at GAC 50, the dissent noted that the pre-1977
versions of the contract provided for no other means, besides termination, for
the use of funds other than the purchase of guaranteed benefits. 25 1 In fact,
Justice Thomas returned to the real world situation of the district court
opinions.252 Looking at changes in the market and the growth of free funds
"beyond the parties' expectations," 253 he noted that the original frustration of
Harris Trust, which prompted the 1977 amendment, lay with the fact that
before the 1977 amendment the only... way [other than 'termination'] the
free funds could be used was to purchase guaranteed benefits for plan
participants. It is difficult to see how a policy that provided for nothing but
guaranteed benefits could be said not to provide for such benefits in its
entirety. 254
He also noted that the 1977 amendment "complicated" matters due to the
payment of nonguaranteed funds. Justice Thomas therefore concluded that he
would rather remand to find the effect of that change.255
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision presents several angles from which to
launch an analysis. This Note focuses on two of its more curious aspects: (1)
the use of securities law to analyze an insurance contract under federal pension
benefits law; and (2) the dynamics of statutory construction that the Court
develops in its analysis.
A. The Application of Securities Law Analysis in Harris Trust
The majority centered its argument on the "lead" it followed from Peoria
249 Id. at 536.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 537.
252 See supra part II.A (discussing the factual background of the parties).
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Union.25 6 In doing so, the majority imported the SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. of America25 7 (VALIC) and United Benefit258 securities cases into the
law of pension benefits,25 9 i.e., VALCs notion of "allocation of investment
risk" and United Benefit's bifurcation method. 260 This Part contends that both
ideas, while superficially appealing, are ill-suited to analyze this case.
In applying VALIC and United Benefit, the Harris Trust majority failed to
grasp fundamental distinctions inherent in the bodies of law involved and the
transactions at hand. First, both securities cases were injunctive actions by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prohibit public offerings
without undertaking registration under section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933.261 Such an action varies greatly from an ERISA fiduciary action in terms
of scope of liability and cure. SEC actions would merely require registration,
whereas the retroactive imposition of fiduciary duty does not allow the
comparatively simple cure of filing, but rather exposes eighteen years of
dealings by an entire industry to huge potential liability. Additionally, these
two areas of law have different origins and goals. Federal securities law, at
least in the context of the cases cited, 262 arguably focuses only on
disclosure.263 ERISA, as noted above, 264 reaches much further than mere
disclosure, primarily by importing trust law standards of conduct. 265 To argue
that the less stringent securities-law standards fit within ERISA's admittedly
comprehensive scheme its to miss the whole point of an exemption. The
application of too narrow a construction to an exemption from the fiduciary
rules not only eviscerates Congress's express aim to make an exemption, 266 but
also thwarts a corollary legislative goal of ERISA, namely the promotion of
256 Id. at 527.
257 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
258 SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1968).
259 See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text for this discussion.
26 0 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 527.
261 See VALIC, 339 U.S. at 66; United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 204.
2 6 2 See supra note 258.
263 Contrary to some state securities laws, federal securities law does not, at least
theoretically, focus on substantive fairness, but only requires adequate disclosure. For a
discussion of the history and background of the adoption of federal securities law relating to
the "battle of the philosophies" of disclosure versus fairness, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 14, ch.1 § G.
264 See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
266 In Justice Thomas's view, Congress intended neither to insulate plans from all risk,
nor intended to subject all persons having any connection with contractual plan assets in the
forms of insurance policies or securities issued by investment companies. See Harris IV, 114




Beyond the contrasting legislative goals of securities and pension law, the
transactions in the securities cases supporting Posner's and Ginsburg's view
vary greatly from GAC 50. In VALIC, a variable annuity case, the Court noted
that one of two main features of the instrument was that "benefit payments"-
money flowing to the parties meriting protection under the applicable law-
varied with investment success. 268 In economic terms, this "benefit payment"
corresponds precisely to the benefit payments made to retirees under the policy,
not to an investment interest component added to a fund from which guaranteed
benefits were purchased, which was the intended use for PAF free funds
according to the structure of the transaction. The majority in Harris Trust was
able to link these different situations only by redefining "benefits" beyond the
statute to include all returns to the fund, as opposed to payments flowing to the
beneficiaries.269 The language of VALTC, 270 so appealing to Ginsburg, cannot
logically be read apart from the transaction upon which that language was
based, namely one in which "[tihe holder of a variable annuity cannot look
forward to a fixed monthly or yearly amount .... "271 That is the "investment
risk" which concerned the Court in VALTC. Such a risk differs from the risk in
GAC 50 in two respects. First, in GAC 50 there is no concern regarding actual
payments to beneficiaries. 272 As the dissent noted, the PAF (the object of the
majority's concern) grew. In fact, it grew more than Sperry and Harris Trust
expected. Notwithstanding Harris's complaints as to its bargained-for costs, 273
"to the extent" of the PAF growth the employer in Harris IV was that much
more able to buy guaranteed benefits, which was, after all, the whole point of
the contract.
In United Benefit, the investment vehicle at issue was one into which a
contractholder deposited premiums to be invested up to some point of maturity.
At that point, the contractholder either cashed out a dollar amount or purchased
an annuity. The SEC sought to separate the agreement into two transactions or
"phases," and to require securities registration as to the first phase.274 In other
words, the SEC argued the nonapplication of the 1933 Act's section 3(a)(8)
267 "The purposes of this subehapter ... are (1) to encourage the continuation and
maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their participants .....
29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (1988).
268 See VALIC, 359 U.S. at 69.
269 This is one of Justice Thomas's major concerns. See Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 535.
270 "[Albsent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable annuity places all the
investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company." VALIC, 359 U.S. at 71.
271 Id. at70.
272 See supra notes 145-51.
273 See Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 537; Harris 1, 722 F. Supp. at 1017.
274 United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 204.
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"insurance contract" exemption to the pre-maturity arrangement. This method
caught the eyes of the Seventh Circuit in Peoria Union and the Second Circuit
in Harris Trust. Problems arise in the application of this division to GAC 50,
however, because the application is by no means an apples-to-apples analogy.
The United Benefit Court focused on two features: (1) before maturity, the
contractholder could withdraw at any time (analogous to any investment); and
(2) the investment "phase" was separable and independent from the annuity,
such that it could be attached to any annuity/insurance product, or offered
separately, and any insurance/annuity product could be offered without the
investment component.275 Such factors are simply not present in GAC 50.
By the policy's terms, Sperry did not have any withdrawal option apart
from termination, which any contract would have to provide. The restrictions
lacking in United Benefit-the very terms about which Harris Trust
complained-were present here to avoid precisely the United Benefit situation.
In fact, such restrictions add protection to employees in the long run by
removing from the ready reach of plan managers a tempting source of money.
Moreover, the PAF was never set up to be separable from the purchase of
guaranteed benefits, unlike the so-called "Flex Fund" component found in
United Benefit. If anything, the PAF's structure dictates a total integration with
the guaranteed benefit component.
In summary, it is argued that the Harris Trust majority rests on thin
ground by applying both substantive and methodological structures to varying
bodies of law which differ as to antecedent roots, goals, and remedies,
especially where the legal "ground" relied upon bears no more than a remote
resemblance to the transactions involved in the case before the Court.
B. The Dynamics and Jurisprudence of Statutory Construction in Harris
Trust
A second problem with this case is the way the Court construed the statute
at hand to reach its conclusion. This section is labeled "dynamics and
jurisprudence" in an effort to highlight the dynamic of semantics present in the
Court's reasoning and to question the legal wisdom of that dynamic. The
contention of the author is that the Court may have acceded to sophistic
advocacy where its own wisdom ought to have remained inviolate, and that
such a concession weakens the Court's consistency, as well as public
confidence in the Court.
The majority opinion in Harris Trust goes through a number of semantic
flip-flops before concluding that free funds are plan assets. The Court initially
claimed to adopt what may be termed a "wide" view of the statute's meaning,
275 See id. at 205-07.
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stating that it would be guided not by one mere sentence or member thereof,
but also by wider concepts of overall legislative purpose.276 Not surprisingly,
the dissent criticized this stance, preferring a model of statutory construction
that focused on the statute itself.277
The majority, however, quickly abandoned its "wide approach" by
focusing, in contradiction to its "not guided by one sentence" language, on the
phrase "to the extent," which it labeled "words of limitation." 278 Not
surprisingly, the Court then reached the conclusion that an exemption to a
general rule should be construed narrowly. Where did the wide approach go in
this analysis? There is a semantic flip-flop, where one says "wide" but means
"narrow." As one continues down the road of the opinion, one might have
expected that in the course of the "narrow view" analysis the Court would still
adhere to its own wide approach understanding. Contradictory as it may sound,
the Court could still have kept intact a "wide angle" view of the statute even
when constrained to construe the provision narrowly. This would have at least
preserved some content to its initial standard. But such hope is ill-placed, for
the wide angle is effectively abandoned in favor of a jurisprudence of ever-
narrowing, hyper-technical definitions. What does remain of the wide approach
has already been discussed, namely the Court's "following" the Seventh
Circuit down the path of importing securities analysis into pension law.
However, that wide angle approach initially announced by the Court is
substantially abandoned in almost every other aspect of the Court's analysis.
The Court narrowed its linchpin phrase "to the extent" to mean "only to
the extent." While the modifier "only" may seem to serve simply to highlight
its referent "to the extent," it in fact expresses far more. It expresses a
misplaced, maternalistic desire on behalf of the Court "to insulate the plan from
all risk," 279 which, though well-intentioned, is not found in the statute and
belies the very existence of an exemption.
This hair-splitting approach of narrowing upon narrowing appears in other
definitions, most notably in the Court's rather amazing definition of "provide
for." As Justice Thomas notes, the majority reading of "provide for" ends up
meaning something akin to a vesting of right to a benefit, instead of the usual
meaning of "to make provision for."280 This definition contravenes not only
accepted legal definitions, but also appears to violate the Court's very
interpretation of that same phrase in a case decided less than a year prior to
276 See Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 523.
2 77 Id. at 533-34 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
278 Id. at 524-25.
279 See id. at 535 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2 80 Id. at 532.
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Harris Trust.281 This is nothing less than definitional inconsistency and
unfortunately could have the adverse effect of raising questions as to the
consistency of the Court in general. The thought might run: How can the Court
construe the same generic term,282 notwithstanding two different contexts, in
two contradictory fashions within a twelve-month period of time? Perhaps such
definitional variance is acceptable or even appropriate since two different areas
of law are involved. If that is the case, one might think the Court follows an
"area-based" or "statute-based" approach to construction. Such an "area-of-
the-law" approach, however, hardly fits an opinion which imports a whole
body of analysis from another area of law.
This definitional inconsistency again surfaces in the Court's view of
"benefits." Here, the meaning of the term seems clear, since "ERISA
uniformly uses the word 'benefits' to refer exclusively to payments to plan
participants or beneficiaries, not payments to plans." 283 The majority concedes
as much, but then proceeds to turn this meaning on its logical head by
connecting the statute's "the amount of which" language with aggregate return
to the plan, rather than with "benefits" payments to individuals. 284 As the
dissent explained:
Given that "benefits" refers to payments to individuals, "amount" standing
alone most naturally refers to the amount owed to each individual. If, on the
other hand, "amount" means aggregate amount, benefits to individuals could
vary so long as the insurance company guaranteed that a fixed total amount
would be paid.2 85
Another example of the Court's curious use of terminology is its focus on
the post-1977 "nonguaranteed" benefits feature of the contract. Both sides of
the bench expressed concern over this term. The majority denied the
application of the guaranteed benefit policy exemption. The dissent would
remand on the issue. Interestingly enough, neither appears to have taken a look
at the real-world working of this feature in relation to the case at hand.
As the lower courts noted, the 1977 amendments granted Harris Trust the
right to use "credits" in the policy's PAF to pay "nonguaranteed" benefits.
This use may have contravened the exemption, yet the primary trustee of the
plan, not Hancock, was the party who desired such an option and who
281 Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187, 2192-93 (1993). See supra notes 237-38 and
accompanying text.2 82 The verb is hardly a technical "term of art," and the fact of nondefinition in either
statutory scheme, both of which are fairly detailed, would tend to indicate so.
283 Harris IV, 114 S. Ct. at 529.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 533 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
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exercised it happily. It was not Hancock who used the free funds for a purpose
other than the purchase of guaranteed benefits; Harris Trust/Sperry did so.
Furthermore, from 1977 it was the plan, not the insurer, who effectively
stopped guaranteeing benefits, since under the 1977 arrangement Harris Trust
needed only to ask Hancock to buy guaranteed benefits, but never did so.
Nevertheless, when Hancock, perhaps seeing sizable depletions in the PAF by
Harris Trust, put a stop to the depletions, Harris Trust turned around and sued
for breach of fiduciary duty-and won. Therein lies the problem with Harris
Tast.286 This point illustrates how what may be a significant part of the reality
of a case is ignored in the perambulations of statutory construction.
In sum, the definitional flip-flops in Harris Trust, and its impractical
importation of securities law, both tend to highlight a jurisprudence of
sophistry where wide angle approaches turn into razor-fine distinctions, where
definitions wander outside the realm of legal and even everyday usage, where
definitions provided in recent cases are disregarded, and where the party who
seeks to use up a pension policy's excess funds manages to convince the courts
that the party who actually stopped the siphoning of funds should incur
fiduciary liability for doing so. Such a jurisprudence hardly nurtures confidence
in the Court.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE
The Department of Labor, whose interpretation was rejected by the Court
and who was left with the option by the Court of providing "administrative
286 Consider the following hypothetical:
A and B contract for a "primary use" (purchase of guaranteed benefits). The funds
connected with the contract (the PAF) grows. A, surprised to see the PAF growing, is
disappointed because it cannot use the funds for non-primary uses. B then allows A to
use funds from this "kitty" for what amounts to related but nonprimary uses (namely,
nonguaranteed payments). A happily does so, but also ceases using the PAF for its
primary use. B exercises its reserved right to cease this non-primary use, thus restoring
the primary focus of the contract, the primary use. A sues B and claims, inter alia, that
B was liable for letting A use funds for the non-primary purpose.
Should A be allowed to assert liability against B on the self-same theory that would, if A
were sued by A's beneficiaries, result in liability to A? Whose interests are being protected
by the suit A v. B-the beneficiaries' or A's? Moreover, which party, disregarding ulterior
motives, showed greater care in the protection of the PAF (something akin to the garden
discussed early on in this Note, the exemption notwithstanding): A, who was more than
willing to use funds for nonprimary (and riskier because nonguaranteed) purpose, or B, who
stopped such nonpayments (perhaps wanting to get back to primary purposes)?
If, in this example, A is Harris Trust, and B is Hancock, one sees more clearly the
paradox of the case.
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relief," issued, in July of 1995, a final regulation 287 to ameliorate partly the
effect of Harris Trust. The class exemption operates to exclude from the
prohibited transactions rules "certain transactions engaged in by insurance
company general accounts in which an employee benefit plan has an interest, if
certain specified conditions are met"2 88 and for certain other similar types of
situations not directly applicable to this Note. Ironically, the regulation cannot
completely ameliorate Harris Trust, since the Department of Labor has
authority to provide exemptions only as to the prohibited transactions rules, but
not to general fiduciary duties.289 Moreover, the Department of Labor's
discussion of the exemption does not do one thing that the Supreme Court in
Harris Trust demanded, namely to squarely address the guaranteed benefit
policy exemption. This lack of action seems to result from the nature of the
Department of Labor regulation as affecting the prohibited transactions rules,
as opposed to the guaranteed benefit policy exemption itself. In a sense, then,
this regulation shares the same structure as IB 75-2, though it does speak
directly to general account transactions. A comprehensive analysis of the
regulation falls outside the scope of this Note, and may be the subject of future
litigation, just as MB 75-2 came up in Harris Trust. In any event, Harris Trust
lives, and will continue to entwine insurers in the thorny rosebush of ERISA.
287 Class Exemption for Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Company General
Accounts, 60 Fed. Reg. 35925 (1995) (hereinafter "Class Exemption").
288 Id.
289 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1988) (vesting power to grant exemptions to general
fiduciary duties in the Secretary of the Treasury); Class Exemption, 60 Fed. Reg. at 35930.
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